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Gareth Matthews believes that children are natural philosophers 
capable of asking and addressing philosophical problems. 
However, their inquisitiveness disappears through socialization. 
Matthews encourages adults to nourish children’s thinking by 
inviting children to think with adults, by allowing them to take 
part in the thinking process of the community, in this case the 
community may be considered as the classroom or a family dinner 
where members of the family discuss matters which attract the 
curiosity of children. Whichever way, adults should be able to 
fashion themselves to children as adults who are thinking and are 
open to talking with children who are just beginning to explore 
their thoughts. With this being said, this extended book review 
will present Matthew’s Philosophy of Childhood and how his 
thoughts can help us rethink how we view children and childhood. 
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Philosophy of Childhood 
Gareth Matthews is prominent for his critique of traditional 
education where children are often limited to be mere followers 
of their teachers, concentrating on the transfer of knowledge, 
therefore, “underrating the voice of the child.” 1  His books 
Philosophy and the Young Child (1982), Dialogues with Children (1984), 
and Philosophy of Childhood (1994) provide us with evidence that 
children can indeed philosophize. These books are compilations 
of Matthews’ discussions with children on various topics such as 
ethics, art, mortality, and happiness, to name a few—here, we can 
easily recognize the philosophical bent of each discussion. 
Through the documentation of these discussions, he raises the 
point that doing philosophy is natural to humans; it is just 
through our organized socialization that philosophy slips away 
from people. What he tried to do in his written works is to re-
establish that philosophy is a natural way of thinking by 
reintroducing philosophy to his students and readers. He poses 
questions that people might have asked during their younger 
years, questions like: “How can we be sure that everything is not 
a dream?” or “How can we be sure that we are ever awake?”2  
In Philosophy and the Young Child, Matthews states that the 
philosophy of childhood must include the following discussions: 
1. A conception of what a child is; 
 
1 David Kennedy and Nancy Vansieleghem, “What is Philosophy for Children, 
What is Philosophy with Children- After Matthew Lipman?”, Journal of Philosophy of 
Education 45, no. 2 (2011): 172. 
2 Gareth Matthews, Philosophy and the Young Child, (USA: Harvard University Press, 
1980,), I.  




2. A conception of what the goods of childhood 
are; 
3. A conception of what cognitive interest and 
goals are appropriate to childhood; 
4. An assessment of what the moral capacities of 
children are; and 
5. A framework for understanding children’s 
rights and responsibilities, as well as parents’ 
rights and responsibilities with respect to their 
children. 3 
He notes that the answers to these five desiderata, as he calls 
it, may be found in Aristotle’s writings. However, he disagrees 
with Aristotle’s take on children as he is against Aristotle’s take 
on women and slaves. If we are to follow Aristotle’s line of 
thinking, we can then surmise that the nature of children is to be 
potential adults and the goods of childhood are derivative from 
the goods of adulthood.4 Here, we can argue that the idea of 
childhood cannot be equated to something less than an adult, the 
whole idea of childhood must be taken separately from that of 
adults, and we are to do an injustice to the development of 
children if we are to look into their development alongside the 
adults’ fullness. Matthews stresses the point that “there are some 
things that many children do better while they are still children, 
than they will ever do as adults.”5 An example of this is child 
art—some of which are inventive, imaginative, colorful and 
 
3 Gareth Matthews, A Philosophy of Childhood (Bloomington: The Poynter Center for 
the Study of Ethics and American Institutions, Indiana University, 2006), 6. 
4 Ibid., 7. 
5 Ibid., 8. 




free 6—as the name suggests, it can only be done by children 
through a child’s gaze and imagination. The discussions about 
these five desiderata may be found in his book Philosophy of 
Childhood which will be discussed further in the latter part of this 
paper.  
Critique of Developmental Psychology 
Matthews was also critical of the Piagetian theory of 
development, because it did not make any allowance for the 
philosophical thinking of children. Children aged four are still in 
the stage of pre-operational thought, and yet, children at this age 
can already ask potent philosophical questions.7 He believes that 
“philosophical thinking in children has been left out of the 
account of childhood that developmental psychologists have 
given us.”8  Therefore, there cannot be a sweeping generalization 
on the development of children. Matthews was once asked, 
“What’s the thought of fourth graders like?” He could not answer 
the question precisely because we cannot point to a generalized 
theory of children’s development.  
If a certain experiment group of children think in a particular 
way, it is illogical to claim that each child belonging to that same 
phase must think that way; an exemption to the said “norm” 
might mean that a particular child is experiencing a certain level 
of abnormality. No wonder, students who think beyond what 
they are “supposed” to think are labeled delinquents or problem 
students in class.  According to Matthews, we need to consider 
 
6 Ibid. 
7 Gareth Matthews, Philosophy of Childhood, 2. 
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that development does not just mean enlargement; we need to 
look into the cognitive, emotional and social development. 9 
However, we need to note that there is still no concrete definition 
of childhood; what we have are theoretical models to guide our 
research.  
Developmental psychologists consider children to live in a 
pre-rational and pre-scientific world. Matthews is against such 
notions, because according to him, “children may understand 
something about the modern, scientific world better than most 
adults do.” 10   He also defends the point that children may 
surprisingly be rational and wise. 11  He stresses that 
“developmentalists are concerned with the normal and standard 
and are almost bound to ignore such remarks and questions on 
purely methodological grounds.”12 The capacity to philosophize 
cannot be measured by such experimentations and methods.  
Matthews noted three points that developmental psychologists 
should address. First is that developmental psychologists are 
bound to ignore the discussions on the development of 
capacity—that is “to think philosophically and discuss basic 
questions openly.”13 Very few adults bother to raise philosophical 
questions and are not concerned whether philosophy is practiced 
well, let alone to think how philosophy can be taught to children, 
or how the ability to philosophize can be introduced to children. 
Second, he emphasizes that developmental psychologists limit the  
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idea of development to biological models where a fully developed 
individual becomes the standard of development. In a paper 
written by Storme and Vlieghe, they argued that childhood “is an 
antidote to current societal developments—relates then to an 
experience that renders it impossible to remain who one is or is 
supposed to be.”14 This is in agreement with Matthews’ initial 
claim that the value of the self is lost in the process of 
socialization; in this case, Storme and Vlieghe claim that the 
experience of childhood might be useful in understanding the 
self. The article also suggests that “childhood is not the negation 
of adulthood . . . it should be taken as such, as the indeterminate 
openness that characterizes or correlates with the world.” 15  
Thirdly, Matthews opens the idea that since Piaget is a towering 
figure in developmental psychology, his method being influenced 
by Swiss and French culture, his line of thinking is more 
pretentious and more systematic. He suggests that the English-
speaking world, on the contrary, has been characterized to be 
unpretentious. He laments over the fact that nowhere in 
developmental psychology can we find a section which discusses 
how children are able to develop philosophical thinking, let alone 
discussions on how to foster the inquisitiveness of children.16 
Piaget made use of experiments to qualify children’s 
development. These experiments can easily be replicated and 
done with children as long as we use the same tools that Piaget 
used. Matthews specifies that Piaget made use of a technique to  
 
 
14 T. Storme,  and J. Vlieghe,  “The Experience of Childhood and the Learning 
Society”, Journal of the Philosophy of Education Society of Great Britain. 45, no. 2 (2011): 192. 
15 Ibid., 191. 
16 Matthews, Dialogues with Children, 118. 




chart the intellectual development of children into three or four 
stages of progression. 17  Piaget tried to outline the mastery of 
children and conclude that the child at a certain age is at a 
particular stage and so on. It would be difficult to conclude that a 
particular child is at a certain level of maturation which subscribes 
to the standard and norm of development. Philosophical progress 
cannot be measured and imposed at a certain age because 
philosophical maturation may be dependent on the exposure and 
experiences of the children. What Matthews is trying to argue 
here is that, these experiments reveal an age-related sequence 
which means that the age of children matters. There is a need to 
consider age-appropriate activities in such a way that it becomes 
futile to teach children a lesson that does not correspond to their 
particular stage. If we are to follow this line of reasoning, then, to 
teach philosophy to children who are in their “pre-rational” stage 
becomes more harmful than helpful. Matthews, however, insists 
that children are more than capable of thinking rationally and 
philosophically—this claim may not be backed up by any 
psychological theory or experimentation, but this conclusion has 
become very evident in his classes with children. He cannot 
propose an age-appropriate philosophizing wherein if a child is at 
age five he should be concerned with the problems of the 
external world or that at age seven he should be concerned with 
abstraction, because such is not the case; as he earlier proposed, 
philosophy is a natural activity of human beings and children are 
the more inquisitive ones.18  
 
 
17 Matthews, Philosophy and the Young Child, 37–38. 
18 Matthews, Dialogues with Children, 36–37. 




Dialogues with Children 
Proof to claims of a child’s ability to philosophize may be 
found in Matthews’ Dialogues with Children.  Here, one finds the 
documentation of Matthews’ philosophical discussions with 
students from St. Mary’s Music School.  Matthews started his 
classes with an incomplete narrative. The children would then 
start pitching in with their insights. After documenting the 
discussion, Matthews would return to the class with a finished 
story based on the discussion. One interesting discussion found 
in the book is the story of the ship Ciudad de Inca. Matthews made 
use of the story of this 1846 ship that sunk and was only 
recovered from the bottom of the sea in 1981. Upon its recovery, 
the ship was restored changing 85 percent of its timber. The 
exchanges from the class are as follows: 
Matthews:  What’s the problem? 
Donald:  The problem is that . . . we want to find 
 out which is which. Is the ship the old 
 ship, or is the ship just a model, a 
 replica, a copy of the original ship? 
David-Paul: That’s easy 
Matthews:  Why is it easy? 
David-Paul: Perhaps the spirit of the old ship would 
 still be there.  
It’s not really a new ship if it’s still got some old timber . . . 
and the spirit of the old ship.19 
 
19 Ibid., 37–38. 




The children wanted to know how much of the Ciudad de Inca 
remained as the old ship with 85 percent of the ship’s timber 
replaced.  One suggested that if the keel remained then the spirit 
of the old ship remained, as in changing parts of a car but 
retaining its original machine making it the same old car. Or it 
could be the same as changing the bricks of an old castle—how 
many bricks need to be replaced to say that the old castle still 
remained. Again, these exchanges just prove Matthews’ point—
that children are capable of rationalizing and philosophizing. 
Another story included in the book touched on ethics. The 
story is about a six-year old boy named Ian. He found himself 
alienated from his own house when three children of his parent’s 
friends monopolized the television which kept him from 
watching his favorite program. He then raises the issue to his 
mother, “Why is it better for three people to be selfish than for 
one?”20  Clearly, Matthews was presenting a utilitarian problem, 
and his students were quick to pick up on the argument.  
David-Paul:  They’re going to visit your house 
 once, you have to make a nice 
 impression. 
Martin:  It’s not very nice to come into 
 someone’s house and say ‘we-want-
 to watch-the Moomins.’ 
David-Paul:  By the way, isn’t it a bit mean, though, 
 because there are three people; with 
 three people, they could all play 
 together. 
 
20 Ibid., 91. 




Martin:  I would hate it, if I was watching 
 TV happily and suddenly somebody 
 comes up the driveway with three 
 weird children. The mom says, ‘Go 
 and watch TV,’ and they come up 
 and say, ‘We want to watch the 
 Moomins.’ I mean, they could easily 
 have watched what Freddie was 
 watching. 
David-Paul:  They have to respect other people’s 
 rights as well. The Moomins are on 
 almost every day21. 
At this point, the students started qualifying, that if the 
Moomins was a series and what Ian wanted to watch was a series 
too, then, both could watch what they missed some other time.  
Here, Matthews was trying to introduce the idea of utilitarianism 
but the children did not take on from there.  
Martin:  It’s not really fair if three people get 
 what they want and leave one person 
 out. That  one person will feel really 
 hurt. 
David-Paul:  It depends on the ages. If one person 
 is really old and the others are small, 
 then the younger children should be 
 allowed to watch their program. 
Richard:  No. You should respect your elders. 
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Matthews:  You have two different principles.  
Donald:  I wouldn’t exactly have minded it. I 
 would say, ‘They only want to watch 
 this one and then tomorrow they’ll be 
 gone and I can watch my program next 
 time.22 
With this, Matthews introduced the idea of the Golden Mean; 
David-Paul then concluded that if everybody used it, it would be 
brilliant. 23  He concludes that children can act morally. He 
disagrees with Kohlberg’s idea that children go through the pre-
moral stage. In another article he discussed that if children’s 
notion of morality will be anchored on or dependent on an 
adult’s idea of morality and if a child soon realizes that the 
authority figures around them are morally flawed, then, their idea 
of what is moral fails. 24 
Matthews gave a lecture to a fifth grade class in Japan. Here, 
he discussed the concept of happiness with the children. Roy, a 
fifth grade student, started the discussion by saying that he finds 
happiness in scratching an insect bite and would not care about 
anything else the moment he starts scratching. 
Yoshimoto:  No matter how happy a person is,
 that person should have more 
 desires than one . . . For each 
 person complete happiness needs to 
 include many more things to make 
 that person happy. 
 
22 Ibid., 97. 
23 Ibid., 100. 
24 Matthews, “A Philosophy of Childhood,” 17. 




Karini:  Perfect happiness must last a long 
 time. One happy moment is not 
 enough for perfect happiness 
Student A: If scratching an insect bite is complete 
 happiness, what happens when you 
 have many insect bites? How will you 
 even know which  insect bite to scratch? 
Student B:   Scratching an insect bite and enjoying 
it so much that, at the moment, you 
don’t want anything else, is only one 
petal of the flower  of happiness.25  
These two class discussions are evidence that children can 
truly think and articulate their thoughts on morality. We can see 
that if children are given the right time and venue they can 
discuss philosophical matters amongst themselves and with 
adults.  
Evident in the works of Matthews is the manner in which he 
linked children’s literature with philosophy. According to him, 
“there is an important strand of children’s literature that is 
genuinely philosophical.” 26  The danger, however, in children’s 
fiction is that, it may be “motivated by the adult’s unhealthy 
infatuation with an idealized child, an infatuation that may be 
sexual in some unconscious or repressed way.”27  The case of 
fairy tales and fantasies may be considered as an example of this  
danger—the author consistently presents the case of a princess  
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who needs a prince to save her from evil curses; as a result young 
girls assimilate themselves with this kind of thinking. Therefore, 
teachers must have the ability to look into children’s literature 
and be able to filter which ones are useful in articulating a 
particular topic in class. 
He documented the use of the story “Many Moons” by James 
Thurber in his class; the story talks about perceptual illusions of 
the size of the moon. “His aim is to convince his students that 
philosophy is a natural activity that could prepare them for 
certain vocations.”28  He stresses the point that when children 
converse, professional philosophers can recognize their 
arguments to be philosophical. This is very evident in children 
ages three to seven, however, the older the children get, the less 
philosophical their questioning becomes. His hypothesis could be 
that children at this age become well-settled in school, and they 
have learned that only necessary questions are to be asked. This 
may then lead to a tendency for children to stop wondering.29 He 
also used Arnold Lobel’s story “Frog and the Toad.” Frog and 
Toad started eating the cookies that Toad baked. They had 
already eaten too much but Toad still wanted another piece. After 
finishing up the cookies, Frog exclaimed that they needed 
willpower to resist eating the cookie. 30   Through this story 
children can start a discussion on what willpower means and how 
it could be possible for them to develop and make use of 
willpower.  
 
28 Ibid., 4. 
29 Ibid., 5. 
30 Matthews, Philosophy and the Young Child, 64. 




In Matthews’ book Philosophy and the Young Child, he narrated 
the story of John who for an instance thought about our lives 
being a part of a film. Here, John held his father’s cello and the 
cello fell over and broke. He went to his mother and whispered 
“I wish everything was on a film and you could rewind it and do 
it over again . . . of course, then it would just happen again 
because there is only one film.”31  We can see here that John is 
alluding to the idea of fatalism—where everything has been 
recorded in a film and whatever was happening was bound to 
happen already, or that what has happened can no longer be 
erased. 
Conception of Philosophy of Childhood 
Gareth Matthews, like Matthew Lipman, first got into thinking 
about the possibility of using philosophy with children when he 
encountered his own children asking about issues that are 
philosophical in nature. In his book, The Philosophy of Childhood, he 
narrates how their family cat, Fluffy, contracted fleas. His 
daughter, Sarah, who was only four years old at that time, asked 
how Fluffy got fleas. He then explained that the flea might have 
jumped off from the other cat to Fluffy. Sarah then remarked 
“How did that cat get fleas?” He gave the same explanation, to 
which Sarah retorted: “But Daddy, it can’t go on like that forever; 
the only thing that goes on like that forever is numbers!” 32  
Matthews found similarities between Sarah’s thinking to that of 
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became convinced that children are capable, not just of asking 
philosophical questions, but of deriving philosophical answers as 
well.  
Matthews recounts that:  
Lipman suggested in a symposium at the annual 
meetings of the American Philosophical Association 
that we might think of philosophy of childhood in 
analogy to the philosophy of religion, philosophy of 
science, philosophy of art, philosophy of history, and 
the many other already familiar, “philosophy of x” 
subjects currently recognized in college curricula.33 
He said that he resisted Lipman’s suggestion at first, but later 
on accepted it. He argues that our notion of childhood is 
historically, culturally and philosophically problematic. But these 
thoughts are “worthy of philosophical examination and 
critique.”34 With this, he was able to teach the first course of 
Philosophy of Childhood at Mount Holyoke College. He 
continues to hope that he could at least help to secure the place 
of Philosophy of Childhood in the philosophy curriculum of the 
future. 35  He suggests that professional philosophers can help 
teachers and parents who are not well-exposed to philosophy to 
“recognize and appreciate some of the naively profound 
questions of childhood.” 36  This can be done by presenting 
philosophically charged arguments and thoughts by children so  
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that parents and teachers can recognize it when their own 
children and students bring it up; from here, the parents and 
teachers can participate in and encourage that line of thinking.37 If 
parents and teachers do not recognize potent philosophical 
questions like: “Daddy, why don’t I see you double because I 
have two eyes? And I can see you with each one by itself?” or 
“How does the big bathroom door get through my small eye?”, 
then, they have missed the chance to explore the ideas better.   
He notes that parents and teachers have been very busy trying 
to nurture and hone the children that they fail to notice that 
children have something to offer the adults—that is, a new 
philosophical perspective.38  In most cases, we offer arguments 
which are highly questionable and yet when children start 
questioning our position we end up reprimanding them. This act 
leads to “impoverishing children’s intellectual lives, this 
diminishes our relationship with children and discourages in their 
children the spirit of independent intellectual inquiry.” 39  For 
adults to talk philosophy to children, they must be able to rid 
themselves of all defensiveness. Matthews stresses the point that 
at a certain moment, children see things with a fresher 
perspective.40  Adults must be sensitive at all times, as children 
may at times be anxious to share what they think about a given 
situation. Adults must be capable to identify such moments and 
be able to address such anxiety rationally without shunning away 
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children’s innocence which shall enable the children to “puzzle 
and muse over the simplest things.”41 This could be the key for 
children to continue being inquisitive and creative—this is a way 
to bar too much socialization from happening within the 
framework of a child’s thinking.  
Conclusion 
Matthews’ criticism of developmental psychology makes one 
realize that one may be objectified by modern science. The 
standardizing and labeling done by developmental psychologists 
actually hinders the exploration of the child’s intellectual 
development.  The convenient labeling of disorders that 
psychologists resort to bars the realization of the other 
potentialities of children. Also, the universalizing done in the 
educational system does not warrant the learning and 
development of children. Standardized testing and standardized 
pedagogy does not give enough room for the intellectual 
development of children.  It makes children think within the 
structure dictated by their educators which is a very potent way of 
ending the inquisitiveness of children.  
Matthews reminds us that “children have the ability to be 
much more independent thinkers than we normally allow them to 
be.”42 The adults must continue to give children the opportunity 
to think for themselves.  The school must not over-burden the 
children with too much work thereby leading the children to just 
merely repeat what their textbooks say as this activity discourages  
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them from thinking. The challenge for adults, both for the 
parents and the teachers, is to rethink their own set of knowledge 
and beliefs.  He posits that if we only allow children to share their 
thoughts and musings, then we are giving them the chance to 
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